By: K. Rashane Jude Pintoe,
MSc in Security, Peacebuilding and Diplomacy.

The Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs (IDIA) recently organised an illuminating lecture by Dr. Benjamin Abrams from UCL on ‘A Hungarian Blueprint for American Politics? Tracing the International Roots of the United States’ Contemporary Political Transformation’. The talk challenged the widespread assumption that democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe is simply a localised or post-communist phenomenon. Instead, Abrams argued that what occurred under President Viktor Orbán in Hungary – the deliberate dismantling and reconstruction of liberal democracy into an arguably “illiberal” regime – now stands as a transferable “blueprint” being exported to the United States before and during President Trump’s second term.

The Hungarian Model and Exporting the Blueprint

Abrams laid out how Orbán’s political machine seized the Hungarian state not in a sudden coup, but through a slow, comprehensive, five-pillar strategy targeting the Constitution, Judiciary, Elections, Media, and Economy. Leveraging a 2010 parliamentary super-majority, Orbán’s Fidesz party rewrote constitutional laws, restructured the courts, redesigned electoral rules, and built an economy and media system that suited the interests of a ruling elite connected to Fidesz. At the same time, the outward trappings of democracy, namely regular elections and constitutional procedures, were preserved, creating a veneer of legitimacy.

One telling anecdote stood out. Abrams described a recent election-watch party in Hungary, where attendees publicly cheered for Orbán, but their faces reportedly fell as soon as his victory was announced. This, Abrams suggested, reflects a deeper, often unspoken, social disillusionment behind the public display of support for Orbán in Hungary.

Reflecting on Trump’s chaotic first term, defined by disjointed attempts at power grabs, internal fractures (for instance, Vice President Pence’s breakaway), and ineffectual January 6 planning, Abrams argued that recent years have served as a “learning period” for US Conservatives. Through networks connecting Budapest and Washington, notably via gatherings such as CPAC Hungary, US Conservatives have carefully studied the Hungarian blueprint, cultivated ties with right-wing European elites, and rethought how to achieve long-term dominance more systematically. Hungary, therefore, is not simply a cautionary tale, but has become a training ground, a hub, even a symbol for the future of American Conservatism.

Weak Response, Fragmented Resistance

Abrams pointed to the relative impotence of mainstream democratic pushback and how this also mirrors what happened in Hungary. The US Democratic Party’s reaction to radical right-wing advances, he argued, remains largely symbolic with protests and moral condemnation but without any coherent strategic alternative. When asked how this can be resisted, he urged avoiding the piecemeal, uncoordinated efforts that characterised opposition in Hungary, and instead advocating a structured, long-term, unified civil society mobilisation.

When questioned about whether a strong pluralistic media and civil society might safeguard the US compared to post-communist Hungary, Abrams conceded that they have been sites of resistance. However, he also argued that Trump commands something Orbán did not – enormously wealthy and politically active oligarchs, individuals with the power of entire states behind them. He cited Elon Musk’s takeover of X (formerly Twitter) as one example, and noted with irony that even institutions like The Washington Post, once symbolically tied to the defence of democracy, now appear more sympathetic to Trump.

On a question about whether Trump and Orbán share not only domestic political strategies, but also a common worldview regarding the global order and global economy, Abrams argued that the real connective tissue between these leaders is what he called a “Nationalist International” – a transnational community of actors who, despite prioritising national interest at home, cooperate across borders on shared cultural and political goals.

According to Abrams, this emerging network allows right-wing leaders to exchange ideas, tactics, and ideological narratives, even if they disagree on foreign policy or economic strategy. In his view, this is what enables the Hungarian model to flow so effectively into American Conservative circles – not through formal alliances, but through a common ideological ecosystem capable of global coordination.

Reflection: Why the Left’s Drift Matters Too

Abrams’s warnings are vital for anyone seeking to understand contemporary international politics. I also believe that to understand why the Hungarian blueprint resonates with a growing constituency in the US, we must also look inward. Over the past decade, many centre-left and progressive parties globally have shifted markedly leftwards, whereby identity politics, aggressive social-justice agendas, and what many perceive as so-called ‘woke’ culture has taken centre stage. For a significant segment of the population, this drift has meant constant cultural upheaval, rapid change in social norms, and a sense that traditional identities or societal norms are being erased.

When this is added to frequent failures to deliver on economic security, border control, or cultural cohesion, it is unsurprising that right-wing and populist leaders succeed. They do so partly because they promise, rather simplistically, a return to order through secure borders, respect for traditional identity, and protection from what many feel is a runaway social agenda. To ignore this context, I believe, is to miss a core part of why illiberalism gains traction.

Therefore, as researchers, analysts, and defenders of liberal democracy, we must do more than simply castigate authoritarian models. We must also engage with the legitimate cultural, economic and social grievances that create fertile ground for radical change. Democratic decline does not arise from abstract ideology alone but also from real social tensions, unaddressed fears, and institutional failures on all sides of the political spectrum.

Abrams’s lecture is a timely reminder that democratic backsliding is no longer confined to specific regions or political contexts. The processes he described – the refinement of illiberal strategies, the cross-border exchange of tactics, and the emergence of what he terms a “nationalist international” – highlight the need for policymakers and scholars to better understand how political models now travel globally. For students of diplomacy, security, and international affairs, the discussion offered both a deeper theoretical grounding and a practical lens through which to analyse contemporary political transformations.